scott-addison-directed-verdictIn June, Judge Robert Ervin granted Directed Verdict in favor of our physician client at the close of Plaintiff’s evidence. Because a Directed Verdict is a white whale in medical malpractice cases (and in many others), we felt the story bore telling. First, it must be said that all counsel involved were highly competent, and the trial was well-fought and contested. The issue boiled down to interpretation of the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine, even at the time of trial.

Our case involved an alleged delay in diagnosis of a salivary gland tumor by an otolaryngologist who was also fellowship-trained in head and neck cancer. The patient first presented to a different physician in the same practice with a mass under her chin in May 2009. She returned to that physician for several visits until June 25, 2009. Fifteen months then passed when the patient returned to the practice, this time to see the physician who we represented at trial (the other physician was originally named in the lawsuit but was dismissed due to the statute of repose). The patient visited the practice in September and October 2010; and did not return until January 2012 (despite instructions to do so earlier). The diagnosis of cystic adenocarcinoma of the submandibular gland was made in April 2012.

The lawsuit was filed on May 30, 2014, approximately two years after the cancer was diagnosed. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant physician was negligent at each of the 2010 visits for not performing an incisional biopsy and in 2012 for not referring her in an expedient fashion. She alleged that even in January 2012, a timely referral would have made a difference in her outcome.

When Plaintiff’s expert was deposed, he was asked if a more expeditious referral in January 2012 would have made any difference in the patient’s staging and outcome. The expert’s testimony was somewhat equivocal, and a jury could have inferred that diagnosis and treatment in January 2012 could have made some amount of difference in her ultimate outcome.

At trial, however, the expert never testified that the physician was negligent during the January 2012 visit or that a different outcome would have been achieved if the patient had been immediately referred. The only criticism related to the care and treatment in September and October 2010.

At the close of Plaintiff’s evidence, we moved for Directed Verdict on the grounds that the lawsuit was filed more than three years after the negligent act(s) giving rise to the cause of action and that the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine did not apply to extend the statute of limitations.

As you likely know, the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine is “an exception to the rule that ‘the action accrues at the time of the defendant’s negligence.” Webb v. Hardy, 182 N.C. App. 324, 327, 641 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2007) (quoting Locklear v. Lanuti, 176 N.C. App. 380, 384, 626 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2006))

The doctrine applies to situations where a doctor continues a particular course of treatment over a period of time. The underlying theory of the doctrine is that so long as the doctor/patient relationship continues, the doctor is guilty of malpractice during the entire relationship for not repairing the damage he did and therefore, the cause of action arises at the conclusion of the contractual relationship. In order to benefit from the continuing course of treatment doctrine a plaintiff must show both a continuous relationship and subsequent treatment from that physician. It is insufficient to show the mere continuity of the physician/patient relationship. Rather, the subsequent treatment must be related to the original act, omission or failure to act that gave rise to the original claim.

Whitaker v. Akers, 137 N.C. App. 274, 278, 527 S.E.2d 721, 724-25 (2000)

When the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine applies, the statute of limitations is tolled for the period of time between the alleged negligent act “and the ensuing discovery and correction of its consequences”; and “the claim still accrues at the time of the original negligent act or omission.” Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 344 N.C. 133, 137, 472 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1996). To take advantage of the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine, the patient must allege that the defendant “could have taken further action to remedy the damage occasioned by its original negligence.” Id. at 140, 472 S.E.2d at 782). In addition to the pleading requirements, “there must be some forecast of evidence that the injury occasioned by the original negligence could be remedied by the treating physician.” Webb, 182 N.C. App. at 328, 641 S.E.2d at 757. In Webb, the Court granted summary judgment when it determined that the doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs had not “forecast any evidence that defendant could have taken any action to remedy the damage occasioned by the alleged original negligence,” despite the fact that the defendant had continued to treat the patient for a year after the injury, and the patient did not learn of the cause of the injury until more than a year after the negligent act. Id.

Taking all of these cases together, the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine, has three main elements that must be satisfied in order to apply: 1) a negligent act; 2) a continued physician-patient relationship where the continued care relates to the original care giving rise to the cause of action; and 3) the ability of the defendant at the later encounters to remedy the original negligent care. Failure to establish all three elements defeats the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine and the statute of limitation is not tolled. Moreover, and most importantly to our case, the elements of the doctrine must be established at each phase of the litigation: pleadings, summary judgment, and trial.

In our case, Defendant doctor treated the patient in September 2010, October 2010, and January 2012. The patient discovered her injury in April 2012, and she filed suit in May 2014. Therefore, the critical date for purposes of the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine was January 2012. If the doctor could have done something to “remedy” his earlier alleged negligence, the doctrine would apply, and the case would have been timely filed. If, however, the die was cast and nothing could have been done in January 2012, then the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine would not apply according to Webb and Horton. Plaintiff had satisfied the elements in the initial pleadings and, arguably, to overcome summary judgment. At trial, however, Plaintiff’s sole expert witness did not give any testimony that either (1) the care in January 2012 was negligent or (2) diagnosis and treatment in January 2012 would have changed the patient’s outcome. Therefore, we argued, the Continuing Course of Treatment Doctrine did not apply as a matter of law, and the case was not timely filed.

Judge Ervin heard our arguments on Monday afternoon. He then asked opposing counsel to provide any case law or arguments the following day, and he, too, performed additional research that night. After listening to further argument Tuesday morning, Judge Ervin very carefully and graciously stated: “In every criminal and civil case I preside over, part of my instructions to the jury always is that they are to take the law as I give it to them and not as they think it is or think it should be. Today, I find myself in the same position, where I have to take the law as it is and not as I think it should be. If I require a jury to follow the law as it is, then I have to do the same. I have doubts about the state of the law in Webb and I do not really agree with what it says. However, I have to follow that law. And so I am going to grant the Defendant’s Motion for Directed Verdict.”

The Plaintiff has decided not to appeal the decision. We captured our white whale.

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